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STATfl1ENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal fran a conviction of and sentencing for ~ counts 
of automobile homocide. 
DISPOSITION IN LCWER CDURI' 
A jury follild the Defendant guilty of each of two counts of automobile 
homocide and the Court sentenced the Defendant-Appellant to tVK) indeterminate 
sentences of Q-5 years at the Utah State Prison, the sentence to run con-
=rently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal and a new trial and, if that relief 
is not granted to order the District Court to resentence the Defendant on 
only one count. 
FAcrS 
On the 27th day of July, 1977 the Defendant was the driver of a truck 
which collided with a motorcycle upon which Ronald Beck and Michael K. Hansen 
were riding, (T-6,T-25). The latter tVK) were killed. There was a passenger 
with the Defendant who testified at trial, Robert Michaell Greenwood (T-l to T-14). 
The truck rolled over after the collision which caused injuries to the Defend-
ant and Greenwood. (T-8,-lO,T-35). And there was evidence that the Defendant 
was in shock for several hours thereafter. (T-10, T-16, T-35, T-61). 
After the Defendant and Greenwood got out of the truck they left the 
scene with a witness, David N. Jones (T-9,-10, T-17) and the Defendant was 
dropped off at his home. (T-10, T-13, T-18). The only evidence presented at 
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trial regarding the intoxication of the Defendant was that he was not 
intoxicated prior to being taken home. (T-11, T-20). 
The accident took place about 9;15 P.m. (T-45, T-38). At about 11:30 p.m .. 
The Defendant rret Bob Greenhalgh, a witness, from the Utah Highway Patrol at 
the American Fork Hospital (T-34) and permitted his blood to be witlrlrawn 
for analysis (T-35). The Defendant was then arrested by the witness Greenhalgh 
for automobile homocide under the Utah Statute 76-5-207 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended). (T-58) 
On the following day officer Greenhalgh had the Defendant sign a waiver 
of rights and discussed the previous day's events with him. The officer then 
reduced the statement to writing and the writing was introduced at trial (T-36, 
T-49 and Exhibit No. 13). 
In that staterrent the Defendant admitted he was the driver, stated he 
had drank beer during the day, that his last beer was about 7:00 p.m. and that 
he could remember nothing after the collision. The witness GreenlM:Xld stated 
that he and the Defendant and several other people drank about two gallons 
of beer over the course of the day (T-4,5, T-11) and the Defendant had his 
last beer at about 8:00p.m. (T-4,5). 
intoxicated (T-11). 
And that the Defendant did not seem 
Over the objections of the Defendant the Court permitted evidence by 
Dr. Albert D. SWensen, PH.D, about the blood alcohol results and the relating 
of those results back to the time of driving (T-17). For Coctor SWensen to 
relate back, the State proposed hyfXltheticals using 8:30 and 7:00 as the time 
for the last drink (T-77, T-78). The Defendant objected (T-77) and was 
overruled. Dr. SWensen stated that if the last drink was at 10:00 p.m. he 
could not calculate the tlocd atcohol level at the time of driving (T-79). 
The Defendant objected to any evidence of his state of intoxication at 
-2-
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the hospital including the introduction of the chemical test. His objection 
was based on the fact there was insufficient factual fourrlation to relate the 
alcohol in his blood at the time of driving with his level of alcohol at 
11:30 since, no one had testified regarding consumption during the intervening 
period. (T-54 thru 57, T-71). The Court utilized a presumption to overrule 
the objection that placed the Defendant in a position of producing evidence 
to over come it. (T-36). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
IN AN AU'I(M)BILE HOMXIDE ProsECUTION, lli ORDER TO UTILIZE THE PRESUMPTIONS 
PROVIDED BY STATUrES 41-6-44 (b) and 41-6-44.5 U.C.A. (as amended 1953), THERE 
MUST BE FACTS OR INFERENCES BASED ON FACTS TO SHCW THAT THE BiroD ALCOHOL-LEVEL 
AT THE TIME OF CHEMICAL TESTS IS BASED ON THE SAME CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL THAT 
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF DRIVING. 
In an automobile homocide case under Section 76-5-207 U.C.A., (1953 as 
amended) a person is guilty if he operates a vehicle in a negligent rna.rmer 
at the time he is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor. . . . to a degree 
that renders the action incapable of safely driving a vehicle." Subparag:r;aph 
(2) of that section permits the District Court to utilize the presumptions listed 
in 41-6-44 (b) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) to determine whether a driver is 
presumed to be intoxicated. 
Section 41-6-44 (b) states that certain well known presumptions exist 
regarding the level of intoxication of a person, based on a measured level of 
alcohol present in that person's blood at the time of extraction. 
Section 41-6-44.5 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) goes on to presume that if a 
blood test is taken within one hour of the alleged incident then the results 
are presumed to be the sarre as at the time of driving. It if is IIDre than 
an hour, then the results of a chemical test must be established by an expert 
-3-
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witness showing its probative value. In either situation the state would 
be required to show that the Defendant did nothing to alter the results of 
his blood-alcohol level between times. In otherwords, the statue is clearly 
designed to meet the evidentiary problems of evidence caused by the changing 
levels of blood alcohol over time in the human body where there is a necessary 
delay between the act and the tests, not to substitute speculation for foundation. 
For any evidence, and especially scientific evidence, to be admitted to 
evidence there are preliminary questions that must be answered to determine if 
they lend credence to the ultimate probative value of the evidence sought to 
be admitted. These are foundational to the evidence. JltConnick on Evidence 
§53 (2nd Ed., 1972). The problem presented here is that no such foundation was 
laid that the Defendant has consumed all of the alcohol reflected in his blood 
test before he had the collision. He clearly could have consumed same during 
the alrrost two hours between the collision and the test with no one, including 
the Defendant, being aware of it. It is improper to assume a state of facts, 
withoutany factual evidence to support the assumption, and, in the light of a 
presumption of innocence, the burden is on the state to provide it. 
In effect, what the District Court ruled was that absent evidence to the 
contrary, a presumption arises that a person has nothing alcoholic to drink 
after an accident and before the blood test. In this instance, while saying 
the burden of prcof does not shift, be indicated that for the Defendant to 
prevail on the issue of intoxication, he must produce evidence negating the 
presumption. (T-56) . This has the effect of making a judicially imposed 
presumption that cannot be supported by any surrounding facts. In further takes 
the form of a rebuttable presumption rather than s:iroply an inference. This 
ruling, the Court places the Defendant in a position of having the burden of 
proof shifted to him, depriving the Defendant of the presumption of innocence 
-4-
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of proof shifted to him, depriving the Defendant of the presumption of 
innocence that is to prevail through the entire trial. State v Patella 
40 Utah 56, 119 Pac. 1023 (1911) and 76-l-501 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) and 
denies his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Gonstitution 
and under Article I, Section 12 of the Gonsititution of the State of Utah which 
protects him from the compulsion of testifying against himself or giving 
evidence against himself. 
The defect in the presumption in this case is there are no evidentiary facts 
upon which to base it. To sorre extent, the law in Utah is, evidentiary matters, 
" .... one presumption or inference cannot rest upon another rrere inference on 
presumption. It can only rest on proven facts." State v Patella, 119 Pac. at 
p. 1028. That rule is not absolute, oowever, and was at least rocx:l.ified in 
State v Hall 105 u. 162, 145 P. 2d 494 (1942). The Gourt there quoted from 
a New York case [citation omitted] in stating the standard to be applied if 
an inference is based on an inference. 
The rule is not that an inference may never be based on an inference but, 
" ... rather than [sic] the prior inferences must be 
established to the exclusion of any other reasonable 
theory rather than merely be a probability, in order 
that the last inference of the probability of the 
ultimate fact may be based thereon." 145 P. 2d at 
p. 497. 
Under either standard the presumption indulged by the District Cburt was 
impermissible and constitutes prejudicial error. There is no logical reason 
to expect that a person in the circumstances of the Defendant would not drink 
any alcohol after a collision. Nor are there any "proven facts" upon which to 
base an inference. 
This Gourt further definedan inference , which, giving any benefit of 
doubt to the State, the District Gourt utilized, in a civil case, Wyatt v 
Baughman 121 U. 98, 239 P. 2d 193 (1951). The Court stated 239 P. 2d 198: 
-5-
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An "inference"or what is, as we have seen, frequently 
called a "presumption of fact" is a logical and reascnable 
conclusion of the existence of a fact in the case, not 
presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the 
fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other 
facts from which, by the pr=ess of logic and reascn, 
based upon carm:m experience, the existence of the assurred 
may be concluded by the trier of the fact. 
There were no facts presented at trial from which "through the pr=ess 
of logic and reascn, based on =mon experience, the existence of the assurred 
fact may be concluded by the trier of fact." Without scme sort of testimony 
about the tendencies of mankind to drink after a tragic accident can we 
assume that tendency is to drink? The only evidence regarding intoxication 
at the t:im2 of driving is that the Defendant was not intoxicated. (T-ll,T-20) 
When the presumptions and inferences allowed under the relevant statutes 
41-6-44 and 41-6-44.5 U.C.A. are admitted to evidence based on an inference or 
presumption not grounded on a proven fact or common experience, the reliability 
of the conclusion is seriously in question. In fact the witness who testified 
pursuant to those statutory requirEments stated that a last drink, after the 
collisio~ made it impossible to determine the alcohol level at the time of 
driving. (T-79) The Court errored in admitting evidence, not based on fact 
and allowing the statutory presumptions to be based on that lack of evidence. 
(See: Inferences based on inferences 5-ALR 3d 100, Sec. 13) 
In anticipation of the response hereto, this case is distinguishable from 
cases involving the relating back of evidence of intoxication to the time of 
driving, (e.g State v Sutliff 97 Eda. 523, 547 P. 2d 1128 (1976,)State v Cannon 
404 P. 2d 971. 17 u. 2d 105 (1965) and State v Bradley (unreported) Utah 
SuprEme Court No. 15307, filed April 17, 1978. In none of these cases has the 
queaion regarding consumption of al=hol after the driving been involved. In each, 
but for the physcial action of the body, the al=hol content was un=ntested as to 
-6-
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the source of al=hol in the blcx:x:1stream. 
Although in this case the state v-Duld have had a difficult, if not 
impossible, task to obtain a conviction, that is not a reason to assume facts 
based on no evidence. If that were the case, then facts necessary to prove 
a case beyond a reasonable doubt could always be provided by the device of 
inventing a presumption. 
The creating of the presumption in this case may not be supported by 
public policy. The sparcity of cases wherein an issue of this nature presents 
itself v.Duld suggest mre information is needed than is presented here. The 
Court's decision on this issue does not take into account the mtivation for a 
Defendant leaving the scene of an accident, his mental state motivating the 
leaving of the scene or any distinguishable factors. A rule of law should have 
a broader application than just one case. 
II. 
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE COURT TO IMPa3E 'IWO SENTENCES FOR AUIOM)BILE 
HOMXIDE \'JHERE THERE \VAS ONLY ONE ACT BY THE DEFENDANT AND THERE WAS NO 
SHewiNG OF INTENT TO HARM ANY PERSON. 
The Defendant was charged with tv-D counts of autorrobile harocide, but 
was sentenced to two terms of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison, the terms 
to run concurrently. The evidence presented at trial necessarily was synonamous 
for both counts. There is nothing in the facts to indicate any severance or 
divivibility of the acts alleged in those counts. 
Section 76-l-402(1) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) forbids sentence, as imposed 
here, for separate offenses arising out of the same incident. That section 
says: 
A Defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action 
for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a Defendant under a 
sinqle criminal episode shall establish offenses which may 
be punished in different ways under different provisions 
-7-
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of this code, the act shall be punishable urrler only 
one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
such provision. 
Pursuant to that section the Defendant should only receive one sentence. 
In an criminal case that is tased on negligence rather than on intentional 
acts there is no logic in double sentences. In a multiple victim crime such 
as robbery, murder or assault logic states that there is a concious choice to 
camnit the act against each of the victims. But where, as is our case, the 
Defendant committed only one negligent act and only wasconvicted of one act 
of being intoxicated, it is unfair and illogical to sentence him for rrore 
acts. 
In Dawson v State 266 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1972) the Supreme Court of Flordia 
set aside one sentence of manslaughter where two victims riding in the same 
autorrobile were killed and the Defendant was convicted and sentenced on tw::l 
counts. A similar result took place in Wyoming where a Deferrlant shot into 
a car containing 5 victims. He was convicted of 5 counts but only sentenced 
for one aggrevated assault. Vig_:L_l~ State \'7yo. 563 P. 2d lll7 (1977) see also: 
State v Little 19 u. 2d53, 426 P. 2::14 (1967) (Convicted of robbery and larceny, 
only sentence for robbery pennitted); People v M:::Farland 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 
373 P. 2d 449 (Calif., 1962) (Burglary and larceny only one sentence); People 
v Duran Colo., 515 P. 2d 1117 (1973). 
In the case of Ladner v U.S.358 U.S. 169, 3L.Ed 2d 199, 79 S.Ct. 209 
(1958) the United States Supreme Court ruled that where a person fired a single 
blast from a shot gun, wounding two Federal officers, is but one assault. The 
Court's rationale being that if two victims consitute two separate assaults 
then the same would hold for fine. The Court felt that because of the nature 
of an assault, it would be unfair, resulting in potential sentences totally 
disproportionate to the act of assault. The same is mere true where an act 
-8-
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of negligence is all that is necessary. 
The Court should remand the case to the District Court for the 
vacation of one sentence. 
CDNCLUSION 
This case should be reversed and remanded to the Fourth District Court 
for retrial. Prejudicial and reversible error was ccrnnitted when the Court 
admitted the result of blood-alcohol analysis into evidence by utilizing a 
statutory presumption of intoxication to rest on a presumption or inference 
that was not based on any facts in evidence. It must be shotm, in order to 
utilize statutory presumptions of intoxication in an automobile homocide case, 
that the Defendant constnned no additional alcohol between the time of driving 
and the time of the blood upon which the presumption was based was extracted. 
In the event the above relief is denied, one of the tv.o sentences imposed 
should be vacated it being double punishment for the same criminal act. 
-9-
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